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I. Introduction
The substitutability between worker types has been an important issue in economics for a long time. The standard approach has been rather eclectic. Workers were categorized in a number of types, and a standard "black box" production function has been applied, for example, a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function or one of the more flexible functional forms that have been proposed by Diewert (1971) . This paper follows a new approach on this issue. The theory of substitution between worker types is linked to another strand in the literature, that of the assignment models (see Tinbergen 1956; Rosen 1974; Sattinger 1975; 426 journal of political economy Heckman and Sedlacek 1985; Teulings 1995) . In these models, both labor supply and demand are heterogeneous. The question is how workers are assigned to tasks in market equilibrium. The wages for various worker types follow as a by-product of the optimal assignment. The natural approach is then to do comparative statics: How do shifts in the distribution of worker types affect both the assignment of workers to tasks and the wages for various worker types? Comparative statics in assignment models therefore answers the same question as the theory of substitution: How do shifts in the relative supply of worker types affect their relative wages?
The analysis in this paper shows that this approach yields a more realistic pattern of substitutability between worker types than most standard black box production functions. The production technology in the assignment model is based on a continuum of worker and task types (see Teulings 1995) . Workers are characterized by a single index, their skill level s. Similarly, tasks are characterized by another index, their level of complexity c. The driving force in the analysis is the Ricardian concept of comparative advantage: better-skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs. The analysis shows that this assumption leads to what I call a distance-dependent elasticity of substitution (DIDES) structure: the smaller the "distance" between the skill level of two worker types, the better substitutes these worker types are. This structure contrasts sharply with, for example, the structure implied by Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) "love for variety" CES production function. There, the increase in the supply of one type reduces its own wage and raises the wages for all other types by the same amount.
The model is applied to the analysis of the general equilibrium effects of a general increase in human capital on relative wages. It turns out that general equilibrium effects can be decomposed into two parts, composition and extension effects. For the sake of argument, suppose that we provide training to 100 workers of skill type s, which raises their skill level to . Suppose that the wage for type is 1 percent higher s ϩ D s ϩ D than that for type s. Since we are in a Walrasian world, this 1 percent higher wage implies a 1 percent increase in the marginal productivity of these workers, so that 99 of the trained workers can now do the job of the 100 untrained workers. The composition effect of the additional human capital on relative wages arises because we remove 100 workers from skill group s (the "source" type) and add the "production equivalence" of 99 workers to skill group (the "destination" type), leavs ϩ D ing the total production capacity of skill groups s and together s ϩ D unchanged. The extension effect of the additional human capital is the 100th worker that we add to skill group . This measures the increase s ϩ D in production capacity.
The composition effect leaves unchanged the production capacity of skill comparative advantage 427 types below s or above relative to the capacity between s and s ϩ D . These workers are assigned to exactly the same c type of task after s ϩ D and before. Nevertheless, I prove the remarkable result that the wages for skill types below s are raised relative to the wages for skill types higher than . Hence, composition effects always compress the wage s ϩ D distribution.
The extension effect captures the effect of the net increase in production capacity of types s and together on relative wages: the 100th worker s ϩ D that is added to group . The extra capacity in the region between s ϩ D s and raises productivity there and hence reduces wages in that s ϩ D region. Slightly higher-and slightly lower-skilled workers are the best substitutes for these workers. Hence, their wages decline too, but by less than those of types s and , and so on. The remarkable feature of s ϩ D extension effects on relative wages is that they cancel if all skill types get the same relative increase in the value of their human capital. The intuition for this result is simple: since all workers get the same increase, the extension effect is equivalent to a proportional increase in labor supply for all skill types. With constant returns to scale, a proportional increase in supply of all inputs raises output but does not affect input prices. Since extension effects on relative wages cancel, composition effects are all that matters in that case. Since composition effects compress the wage distribution, an equiproportional increase in the human capital of all workers will compress the wage distribution. Teulings and van Rens (2002) provide support for this idea, using panel data over the postwar period for some 100 countries.
This analysis has important implications, both for the measurement of the returns to training programs and for economic policy. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a, 1998b) have argued that standard methods for evaluating training programs are biased, since they ignore general equilibrium effects. My analysis confirms their conclusion and provides a general way to characterize this effect. The results enable a better targeting of training programs to the relief of the low-skilled. Programs that are geared to somewhat better-skilled workers can be more effective, since less skilled workers benefit from the general equilibrium effects.
The particular nonlinearities of my model can resolve a puzzle regarding the increase in wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s. While the return to human capital has gone up for all wage levels more or less by the same amount, changes in the supply of and demand for skill differ greatly between skill levels. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) have shown that the demand for skill has gone up in the highest percentiles of the skill distribution only. This combination of an increase in demand only at the top and an across-the-board increase in the return to human capital has been hard to explain. However, next to the increase in demand at the top, the fall in minimum wages during the period is journal of political economy likely to have produced an increase in skill supply at the lowest percentile of the skill distribution (people who were previously without a job because of the minimum wage). Teulings (2003) has shown that the fall in minimum wages indeed had large effects on relative wages, consistent with the predictions of the DIDES model. Also, in this model, the combination of an increase in the demand for skill at the top and an increase in supply at the bottom yields the equiproportional increase in the return to human capital at all skill levels that are observed empirically.
A crucial role in the analysis is played by the locus of log wages in market equilibrium, , and in particular by its first and second dew(s) rivatives. The complexity index c is defined such that it measures the log productivity gain of an additional unit of skill. Hence, the higher c, the more the level of skill matters, which is the definition of comparative advantage. In equilibrium, a type c firm hires that worker type for which the first derivative is equal to its c: the marginal relative w (s) productivity gain of an additional unit of skill, c, is equal to the marginal relative increase in wage cost,
. This relation provides a direct link w (s) between the assignment of workers to tasks and the wages for worker types. Changes in the one feed back into the other, and vice versa. Hence, the second derivative measures the sensitivity of the equiw (s) librium assignment to small shifts in wages. When the second derivative is high, shifts in wages have small effects on the equilibrium assignment. Hence, worker types are bad substitutes. The crucial role of the magnitude of this second derivative has a direct analogue in the standard approach to the substitutability between types. There, elasticities of substitution are derived from the second derivative of the cost function. Here, takes over that role. w (s) I introduce the concept of the complexity dispersion parameter. HicksAllen elasticities of complementarity (Hicks-Allen elasticities of substitution will be shown not to be a useful concept in the context of a DIDES structure) are fully determined by the distribution of wageswhich can be observed directly from the data-and this complexity dispersion parameter. It measures the degree of comparative advantage. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a measure of the cost for a firm of not hiring the optimal worker type: the higher the complexity dispersion parameter, the higher the relative cost increase of hiring a too highly or a too lowly skilled worker. The great advantage of the complexity dispersion parameter is that it is free of dimension, so that it can be meaningfully compared across countries, across time, and across various points in the wage distribution.
I provide a simple workhorse model in which both the supply of skill and the demand for complexity are assumed to be distributed normally. When the standard deviations of both distributions are equal, this workhorse model yields a convenient closed-form solution for the wage dis-tribution and the complexity dispersion parameter. Up to now, Tinbergen's (1956) paper was the only known closed-form solution in this class of models. Furthermore, I provide a Taylor expansion of the equilibrium for the case in which the standard deviations of skill supply and complexity demand are different. A rise in the mean of the skill distribution can be interpreted as human capital accumulation, and a rise in the mean of the complexity distribution as skill-biased technical change. Both have exactly opposite effects on relative wages. This provides a convenient parameterization of Tinbergen's race between education and technology.
When the standard deviations of skill supply and complexity demand are equal, the workhorse model provides an additional interpretation of the complexity dispersion parameters as being the compression elasticity: the percentage reduction in the Mincerian rate of return to human capital per percentage increase in the value of the stock of human capital. I provide a simple transformation rule of Katz and Murphy's (1992) much-cited elasticity of substitution between low-and highskilled workers of 1.4 and the complexity dispersion parameter. According to this rule, the complexity dispersion parameter is about two. Under the assumption of an initial rate of return to a year of schooling of 10 percent, an increase of the average level of education of the workforce by one year reduces this rate of return by percent p 2 # 10 20 percent, that is, from 10 percent to 8 percent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sets out the structure of the economy and the cost function that goes with it. Section III deals with the derivation of the elasticities of substitution and complementarity. In Section IV, the complexity dispersion parameter is introduced, and the framework is applied to a general increase in human capital. Section V presents my workhorse model. Section VI presents conclusions.
II. The Structure of the Economy

A. Assumptions
Consider an economy producing a composite commodity by means of the input of an infinite number of different tasks. Production does not require other inputs. Task types are indexed by a continuous index , . The index c will be referred to as the level of task 
where Y is the output of the composite commodity and is the log x(c) input of task type c. The log cost function per unit of output for this Leontief technology is
where p denotes the log price per unit of output, and is the log p(c) price of a type c task (the tilde is used to distinguish task prices from the price of the composite commodity). A type c task can be produced by workers with various skill levels, which differ by their productivity. (Teulings 1995, 285) . Absolute advantage implies that an additional unit of skill yields higher output, irrespective of the task type c to which a worker is assigned ( ). Comparative advantage implies that the higher task comf (7) 1 0 of skill ( or, equivalently, is log supermodular). Ds f (7)f(7) 1 f (7)f (7) f (7) 12 1 2
In part 2 of assumption A, the right-hand side is multiplied by such Ds that the limit of of total employment converges to a constant. Ds r 0
N i i
The functions and can be interpreted as the log density funcx(s) d(c) tions of skill supply and complexity demand, respectively.
B. Market Equilibrium and the Cost Function
Consider a market equilibrium in this economy. This equilibrium is characterized by an aggregate level of output Y, an assignment of worker types to task types c, and a vector of log wages for each worker such s w i i
that (i) all worker types i are fully engaged in the production of at least one c type, (ii) the markets for all c types clear, and (iii) each type c firm employs that worker type i that minimizes production cost per unit of output. Condition iii implies that a type c firm chooses its worker type i so as to minimize the cost per unit of task c,
be a firm type that is indifferent between employing worker type i c i and type and weakly prefers these types above others. Hence, is i Ϫ 1 c i defined implicitly so as to satisfy
i i
where D is the first-difference operator. Furthermore, it is convenient to define as the locus of wages that applies in the limiting case of w(s) continuous variation in s:
A full characterization of the equilibrium is not required for the purpose of this paper (see Teulings [1995] for that into a one-to-one correspondence between and c. Part 3 states that s i better-skilled workers earn higher wages because of absolute advantage. Part 4 is a direct implication of part 2. In fact, the condition c Ds p i in equation (2) 
For the derivation of the cost function of the composite commodity of this economy, it is useful to write as a function of and : c w w
1 Iϩ1 By the zero-profit condition for firms, the task prices for all tasks satisfỹ
Substituting these relations in equation (1) yields the log cost per unit of the composite commodity as a function of a vector of log wages p(w) for all worker types:
where denotes the vector of input prices (throughout the paper, w { {w } i vectors are underlined). The wages of worker types enter along two channels. First, they enter in the integrand: production cost per task type, with the assignment of workers taken as given. An increase in w i raises the production cost for the task types that employ c [c , c ] i iϩ1 type i. Second, they enter via the upper and lower bounds of the integration intervals. Each interval delimits the set of tasks c that employ a particular worker type i. An increase in induces firms close to the w i borderlines of the interval to shift their demand to neighboring [c , c ] i iϩ1 skill types and , respectively: shifts upward and shifts
downward. The cost function (5) is the starting point of the analysis of elasticities of substitution and complementarity in the next section.
III. Derivation of the Elasticities
Suppose that we increase the labor supply of a skill type i in this economy or that we increase the supply of a number of types. What is the effect of such changes in the skill distribution on relative wages? To answer this type of question, we need to know the values of the Hicks-Allen elasticities of complementarity, which measure the effect of a change in the supply of type i on the wages of all types. As is well known, these elasticities can be derived easily from the second derivatives of the production function: the first derivative yields the marginal productivity of each type as a function of all inputs. In equilibrium, marginal productivity is equal to the wage. Hence, the second derivative yields the effect of changes in the input of any skill type on type i's wage rate. Regrettably, an explicit expression for this production function is not available, so that we have to revert to the more complex approach of deriving elasticities of complementarity from elasticities of substitution. Hicks-Allen elasticities of substitution measure the effect of changes in the wage of type i on the input demand for all skill types. These elasticities can be derived from the second derivatives of the cost function: the first derivative yields input demand as a function of all wages. Hence, the second derivative yields the effect of changes in the wage of any skill type on type i's input demand. Since an explicit expression for the cost function is available, Hicks-Allen elasticities of substitution can be easily derived. From there, deriving Hicks-Allen elasticities of complementarity is just a problem of matrix inversion: going from a system of linear equations that specifies log inputs as a function of log wages to a system that specifies log wages as a function of log inputs. This is the exercise I undertake in this section. First, I derive Hicks-Allen elasticities of substitution from the cost function of the economy. Next, the system of linear log wage functions is inverted in order to derive the Hicks-Allen elasticities of complementarity.
A. Substitution
Hicks-Allen elasticities of substitution measure the effect of changes in log wages on log input demand: antees that the perturbation of input prices is such that the output dw price remains constant. As is well known, the off-diagonal elements of the matrix H are equal to the matrix of second derivatives of the log cost function , pre-and postmultiplied by the inverse matrix of value p(w) shares:
A of App. B, in the online edition, for a formal proof). The application of this expression to the cost function for this economy, equation (5), yields the following proposition. Proposition 2. Consider the economy described in Section II. Let . The elasticities of substitution satisfy Ds r 0 1.
;
2.
; and
of value shares, and is a vector of zeros. 0
The derivation of this result is relegated to Appendix A. The function can be interpreted as the density function of the value of input v(s) across s for the limiting continuous case. The elasticities of substitution not adjacent to the main diagonal satisfy the Leontief result of a zero elasticity of substitution. Hence, a change in does not change input w i demand for , i, . Only employers of types and shift
their labor demand from type i to types and , respectively, i Ϫ 1 i ϩ 1 pushing up demand for these types. They were indifferent between using and i, and i and before the increase of and therefore i Ϫ 1 i ϩ 1 w i strictly prefer type and type after the increase. In equation i Ϫ 1 i ϩ 1 (5), this can be seen from the fact that the cross derivatives of the boundaries of the integration intervals, and , are
nonzero for these entries only. Proposition 2 has an important implication for empirical research into the value of elasticities of substitution between worker types. In the limit , , the number of elements of H adjacent to the I r ϱ Ds r 0 main diagonal relative to the total number of elements goes to zero. Hence, H converges to zero almost everywhere. Furthermore, does not exist. The entries on and adjacent to the lim h
main diagonal go to infinity when . Elasticities of substitution are Ds r 0 comparative advantage 435 therefore not a useful concept for empirical research in the context of this model, since their value is not defined independent of the choice of . Elasticities of substitution depend strongly on the coarseness of Ds the classification of worker types that is applied (see Teulings [2000] for an application to the effects of minimum wages). Let us therefore turn our attention to the elasticities of complementarity.
B. Complementarity
Hicks-Allen elasticities of complementarity measure the effect of changes in log inputs on log wages:
where is an matrix of elasticities of complementarity. The E { {e } I # I ij matrix E can be derived from the inversion of the bordered Hessian matrix of elasticities of substitution:
B of App. B in the online edition for a formal proof), where H ϩ is the "bordered" matrix of substitution elasticities; (I ϩ 1) # (I ϩ 1) bordering of the matrix takes account of the restriction that we consider price perturbations that leave the price of the composite commodity unaffected, . 1 The braces denote an operator that drops the 0 p p (w)dw w borders (the final column and row) of a matrix. This expression is applied to the elasticities of substitution presented in proposition 2 to obtain the elasticities of complementarity . The complementarity matrix has some attractive features. The first and second terms in the first line of proposition 3 depend only on s i and , respectively, and the third term is a constant. Hence, the cross s j derivative is equal to zero (the subscripts i refer to the partial e (7) 12 derivatives with respect to its ith argument), and the first derivative has a simple structure:
The trajectory of for a fixed starts flat from the lower support e(s , s ) s
cally until it reaches a minimum value at the main diagonal. Beyond the main diagonal, the reverse is true. Hence, is nondifferentiable e(s , s ) i j at the main diagonal. The locus is depicted in figure 1 for the e(s , s ) i j case of a constant second derivative of the log wage function and a uniform distribution of value shares. The nondifferentiability at the main diagonal strikes out immediately. Obviously, the main diagonal is negative everywhere since the matrix of elasticities should be negative definite. Hence, this is a general feature holding for any or . w(s) v(s) The same is true for the fact that the main diagonal is most negative at both extremes. The reason is that the trajectories of , with e(s , s ) s i j j held constant, are parallel since (except for the main diage (7) p 0 12 onal). Starting from the border of the matrix, where the trajectories are flat, the trajectories go down at an increasing rate. At both extremes, this process continues the longest and, hence, yields the most negative outcome. Hence, changes in labor supply have a much larger effect on relative wages for extreme skill types than for the median skill type. This explains why a reduction in the minimum wage, which is likely to in-2 The characterization of e (7) 
, and (the latter is the bordering element). Furthermore, 
crease effective labor supply for the least skilled worker types, has such a huge effect on relative wages (see Teulings 2000 Teulings , 2003 . is determined by the requirement that the areas above and below the horizontal axis must have equal surface, since the value-weighted sum of complementarity effects is equal to zero. Figure 2b shows process materializes by spillover effects from one market segment to the other, in both the upward and the downward direction of the task hierarchy. All this invokes a chain of relative wage changes, where the wage of type j is reduced the most and the wage reductions become smaller the further away from type j we are. This is the essence of the DIDES structure. To visualize the contrast with the standard continuoustype CES structure à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , the locus of substitution elasticities for this production function is also plotted in figure 2a as the dotted line. It shows an (infinitely large) 4 negative spike at the own type j and an equal and small positive effect for all other types.
The shape of the wage effects of changes in the supply of the extreme skill types can help to account for the specific form of the increase in wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s. Juhn et al. (1993) have documented that return to education has gone up for all wage levels more or less by the same amount during that period (see panel D in their fig. 4 on p. 418) . However, the demand for skill has gone up only in the highest decile of the skill distribution (see panel D in their fig. 9 on p. 435). This combination of a demand increase only at the top and an across-the-board increase in the return to human capital has been a puzzle. The DIDES structure can explain why an increase in skill demand at the top has an effect on relative wages all across the board, which partly resolves the puzzle. However, the concave/convex shape of the curve in figure 2a implies that the relative wage effects are the strongest at the point of the distribution at which skill demand is increased, which is inconsistent with the equiproportional increase in wage differentials that has actually occurred. But next to the increase in demand at the top, the fall in real minimum wages during the period is likely to have increased skill supply at the lowest percentile of the skill distribution: the people who could be profitably employed only after the fall in the minimum wage. Teulings (2003) has shown that the fall in minimum wages indeed had large effects on relative wages, consistent with figure 2a: sharp declines in relative wages at the bottom of the distribution, which gradually die out higher up in the wage distri-4 Suppose that we increase supply for an interval Ds. Since value-weighted complementarity effects sum to zero,
CES CES
Ds # h ϩ (1 Ϫ Ds)h p 0. bution. So, both the increase in demand at the extreme top and the increase in supply at the extreme bottom raised wage differentials, but both forces had their largest impact at different places in the wage distribution. However, the curvatures of the curves in figure 2a associated with both forces offset each other. So, their net effect might have been the overall increase in wage differentials that has actually occurred.
IV. Relative Wages and Investment in Human Capital
A. The Complexity Dispersion Parameter
While proposition 3 provides a useful characterization of elasticities of complementarity, the expression is not easily interpreted empirically. The wage distribution can be observed directly from the data. A direct empirical counterpart of s is not available. Since , there is a w (s) 1 0 one-to-one correspondence between the skill level and wages. Hence, we can characterize workers just as well by their wage as by their skill. It is therefore a useful idea to recast proposition 3 in terms of the distribution of log wages instead of skill. Let . Then
is the distribution of value across wages 5 (hence
, and . Elasticities of complemen-
w { w(s ) tarity are therefore fully defined in terms of the wage distribution, which is directly observable from the data, and the parameter is defined g(w) in (9). This parameter incorporates the role of the second derivative of the wage function. By equation (3) 
The first-order term drops out by the envelope theorem. The final term is the excess cost of an out-of-equilibrium assignment. Hiring a better-(or worse-) skilled worker than the optimal type raises (lowers) productivity, but this effect is more (less) than offset by the higher (lower) wage bill. The excess cost is therefore a second-order effect. Instead of expressing this excess cost as a function of the skill differential relative to the optimal skill type, , I can also express it as a function of the s Ϫ s i log wage differential relative to the optimal wage level, x% { w Ϫ ; hence, x is the percentage deviation from the optimal w p (s Ϫ s )/w (s) i i wage level. The excess cost as a function of this percentage deviation from the optimal wage is proportional to the complexity dispersion parameter:
The complexity dispersion parameter can therefore be interpreted as the curvature of the cost function of the production of task type , c i where the costs are expressed as a function of log wages instead of skill types (or, alternatively, where skill types are indexed by the wage they command). In terms of Rosen's (1974) famous imagery of cost curves kissing the hedonic price function, is the hedonic price function, w(s) and the complexity dispersion parameter is the curvature of the kissing cost function. The concept of a complexity dispersion parameter therefore has an important role to play when extending the Walrasian assignment model with search frictions. In such a world, job seekers face a trade-off between the cost of accepting the suboptimal assignment of the current job offer and the revenues of continued search for a better assignment. Then, the complexity dispersion parameter measures the cost of suboptimal assignment (see Teulings and Gautier 2004) .
The complexity dispersion parameter is not a structural technological 442 journal of political economy parameter like the elasticity of substitution of a CES production function. This can be seen immediately from the fact that its definition depends on the endogenous locus . The parameter may vary along w(s) the domain of s within a particular economy and between economies, for example, by differences in the distributions of either skill supply, , or complexity demand, , analogous to value shares in a CES x(s) d(c) function, which change by shifts in factor inputs.
A crucial feature of the complexity dispersion parameter is its insensitivity to a linear transformation of the skill variable. 6 The relevance of this feature is that the metric of s can be established empirically only up to a linear transformation (see Teulings 1995, 301) .
7 Statements such as "the variance of s is such and such" are therefore devoid of any empirical content. To the contrary, the statement "the complexity dispersion parameter is two" has a clear empirical interpretation. I shall return to this issue in Section V. When between-economy variation in either or is available, the complexity dispersion parameter can d (c) x(s) be estimated (see Teulings 1995) .
B. The Distributive Effects of Additional Human Capital
The framework developed so far can be used for many applications. One application, the acquisition of additional human capital, deserves special attention since it reveals some remarkable characteristics of this production structure. Let us consider a pattern of increases in human capital by one step for a fraction of the type workers. Hence, Ds q (s ) s j j a fraction of the type workers (the "source" type) is moved to q(s ) s j j type (the "destination" type). I take it that is a small s p s ϩ Ds q (s ) jϩ1 j j number such that . This setup can capture any dis-
tribution of additional human capital across skill types. At first sight, it seems restrictive to consider increases in human capital by only a single step . However, in the limit for , it does not matter whether a Ds Ds r 0 share of type increases its skill by or a share increases
its skill by 2Ds. The direct effect of this additional human capital on the wage distribution keeps log wages per skill type, , constant and accounts for w(s ) (s, c) p exp (sc) p exp (sc) exp (a a c) p f (s, c) exp (a a c).
The second factor is equivalent to a redefinition of the units of measurement of task type c. Since the output of tasks has no empirical counterpart, this redefinition can be carried through without further consequence. 
The concept is the relative increase in the stock of human h[w(s)]Ds capital of all workers of source type s evaluated at market prices, is q(s) the fraction of workers who take the increase Ds, and is the market w (s) valuation of a unit increase in s. In fact, is the relative wage increase w (s) per unit of additional skill or, equivalently, the Mincerian rate of return to human capital.
I present the proof of proposition 4 in the text since it is instructive for the subsequent argument. Consider the effect of the human capital acquisition of type on the distribution of labor supply. Since a fraction s j leaves the source type , we have ; and since these
workers move toward the destination type , we have .
Since ,
journal of political economy Substitution of this expression in equation (7) yields QED Proposition 4 reveals that the general equilibrium effect of the additional human capital can be decomposed into two parts, the composition effect-the term in the first equality of proposition 4-and the e (w , w) 2 i extension effect-the term . The composition effect refers to the e(w , w) i change in the composition of labor supply, and the extension effect is associated with the increase in total productivity by the additional human capital. As proposition 4 shows, both effects have the same order of magnitude. They can be explained most easily by considering the acquisition of human capital by type separate from the acquisition by s j other types, that is, . For this special case, proposition 4 h(w ) p 0
( 1 1 )
Ds
The first term in braces is the composition effect, and the second term is the extension effect.
The composition effect is due to the shift of some labor supply from the source type to the destination type . These effects are depicted s s j j ϩ1 graphically in figure 3 , which repeats figure 2, but now combining the negative effect on the supply of the source type and the positive effect on the destination type. In figure 3a , the continuous line is the effect of the reduction of the supply of the source type, and the dotted line is minus the effect of the increase of the destination type. Hence, the wage goes up when the dotted line is above the continuous line, which is the case for . The reverse applies for . Figure 3b shows
the effect on the assignment of worker types to tasks. The labor supply of type is reduced by a fraction . Hence, the remaining workers s q (s ) worker types remains unaffected: is unchanged. c i,i(jϩ1 The implication of this analysis is that the composition effect of any increase in the stock of human capital compresses the wage distribution. The wages of worker types skilled less than type are increased, and s j all by the same amount; see the first term between braces in equation (11), which does not depend on i, and the wages for types are
reduced, also all by the same amount. A share gets a wage increase F(w) of , whereas a share gets a wage reduction of , so 1 Ϫ F(w) 1 Ϫ F(w) F(w) that both cancel in aggregate. For example, the composition effect of any additional human capital between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the skill distribution decreases the 10-90 log wage differential. This is a somewhat surprising conclusion since the assignment of workers 446 journal of political economy to tasks remains unaffected, except for . Equation (3) this implies that the level of the wages must go up for less skilled workers and go down for more skilled workers. The extension effect accounts for the fact that the increase in the labor supply of the destination type is larger than the decrease of the s jϩ1 source type when evaluated at market prices. This is the factor s j in equation (10) positive. The effect of this extension of labor supply on relative wages and on the assignment of workers to tasks can be read directly from figure 2a: it shows that the wage of types and goes down the most s s j j ϩ1
and that this negative effect is smaller for skill types at a greater distance and becomes eventually positive. Figure 2b shows the effect on the assignment of workers to jobs. Since the supply of types and together s s j j ϩ1
has been increased, they serve a greater range of tasks, leaving a smaller range for either less or more skilled workers. that is represented in figure 3 : only changes, and all other 's are c c jϩ1 i
unaffected. The total effect of the human capital acquisition can be represented by adding figure 2 (for the extension effect) and figure 3 (for the composition effect). As discussed, the composition effect leads unequivocally to a compression of wage dispersion. Figure 2 shows that the impact of the extension effect on wage dispersion depends on the position in the wage distribution. A human capital acquisition at the bottom increases dispersion (since it mainly raises wages at the top), whereas an acquisition at the top decreases it (since it mainly raises wages at the bottom).
Corollary 1. Consider an equiproportional increase in the value of human capital for all :
. The extension effects of this ads h(w ) p h Hence, the term in the last line of proposition 4 cancels. The intuition for this result is that an increase in the value of the human capital by an equal percentage for all worker types leads to an equal extension effect for all types. Hence, the sum of the extension effects is equal to an increase in labor supply for all types by an equal percentage. Since the economy described in Section II is characterized by constant returns to scale, an equiproportional increase in the labor supply of all worker types does not affect relative wages. Corollary 2. Consider an equiproportional increase in human capital, , in an economy in which the complexity dispersion h(w ) p h j parameter is constant:
. Then
The proof of corollary 2 applies proposition 4:
By corollary 1, the extension effects (the second term) cancel. Dividing both sides by and using (w Ϫ w )/Ds
yields corollary 2. QED The case of a constant complexity dispersion parameter provides, therefore, a useful benchmark. It implies that the curvature of the cost function for a specific task type c, or alternatively the cost of an out-ofequilibrium assignment, is the same for all tasks. In the next section, I provide a simple specification of the supply of and demand for skill that generates a constant complexity dispersion parameter. Since the extension effects of an equiproportional increase in human capital cancel as a result of corollary 1 and since the composition effect yields a compression of the wage distribution, the combined impact of both effects is a compression. Corollary 2 provides a simple and useful rule of thumb for the magnitude of this compression: the percentage reduction in the Mincerian rate of return to human capital, per percentage increase in the stock of human capital, is equal to the complexity dispersion pa-journal of political economy rameter. Alternatively, the complexity dispersion parameter can therefore be interpreted as a compression elasticity.
These results on the compression and extension effect have strong policy implications. Heckman et al. (1998a Heckman et al. ( , 1998b have argued that standard methods for analyzing the returns to training programs are biased since they ignore general equilibrium effects on wages. The DIDES model provides strong support for this notion. As long as the program is experimental and only a limited number of people are actually treated (the fraction of type s workers who obtain additional human capital, , is small), the shift in the skill distribution will be too q(s) small to affect skill prices. Then, a training program will have only partial equilibrium effects; that is, the training program can be evaluated taking as given. However, the more people are treated by the program w(s) ( is large), the greater the importance of the general equilibrium q(s) effect. Then skill prices will be affected, which reduces the effectiveness of the program.
V. Relative Wages, Human Capital Accumulation, and Skill-Biased Technical Change
So far, I have considered a completely general formulation of the distribution of skill supply and complexity demand, and , respecx(s) d(c) tively. In this section, I make some convenient parametric assumptions on these distributions. The framework developed in Section IV can then be applied to analyze the effects of shifts in the parameters of the skill distribution on the locus of relative wages. An important feature of these parametric assumptions is that they include the special case analyzed in corollary 2, where both the human capital acquisition h and the complexity dispersion parameter g are independent of s. For the purpose of this exercise, it is convenient to use transformed skill and complexity variables and , respectively, which are defined as 
VI. Some Final Remarks
The comparative advantage in production technology has been shown to imply the distance-dependent elasticity of substitution structure, where the substitutability between types declines with their distance in terms of their skill level. For many applications, this structure is more realistic than, for example, Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) continuous-type CES production function, where all inputs are equally substitutable. Moreover, where the substitution process in the CES function is a black box, the DIDES model is based on an explicit assignment model. The comparative advantage framework links the theory of substitution to assignment models (see Sattinger 1993) .
General shifts in the distribution of human capital do not provide a good testing ground of the implications of the DIDES framework, for example, vis-à-vis the Dixit and Stiglitz CES function. The reason is that the peaked patterns of complementarity depicted in figure 2 tend to cancel out when the skill distribution is shifted simultaneously for many skill groups. The ideal experiment is an increase in minimum wages. This policy experiment deletes the least skilled workers from employment and therefore has a clearly defined impact on the skill distribution. Moreover, deleting the lowest-or the highest-skilled group has the most pronounced effect on relative wages (see fig. 1 ). The DIDES framework predicts substantial spillover effects of the increase in the minimum wage to higher wage levels, since firms switch their labor demand to the closest substitutes for the least skilled workers who are thrown out of employment. Teulings (2003) offers empirical evidence for these spillover effects.
The results on the acquisition of additional human capital have important positive and normative implications for economic policy. They point to a set of both positive and negative externalities of the schooling decision of one skill type to the value of human capital of other skill types. A type s worker who has to decide on the investment in capital takes wages as given. She will set the return to an additional unit w(s) of skill, , equal to the cost of acquiring that human capital. She w (s) does not take into account that her decision has a general equilibrium effect that affects the wage function as such. The composition effect w(s) yields the unambiguous prediction that workers skilled less than s gain since their wages go up, whereas workers skilled better than s lose (the predictions regarding the extension effect are more ambiguous). Obviously, these positive and negative externalities evaluated at their monetary value cancel, since the value-weighted sum of substitution effects equals zero in a constant returns to scale world, as considered in the paper. However, the political process might attach different weights to the value of various citizens. A median-voter model in which the mean income exceeds the median is a typical example. On the positive side, these externalities might explain why many democracies subsidize higher education; see Dur and Teulings (2004) for a formal analysis. On the normative side, there are implications for the targeting of training programs for the relief of the low-skilled. It might not be optimal to target these programs tightly to the left tail of the skill distribution in order to improve the position of the least skilled workers. Such targeting might be counterproductive, by both the composition and the extension effects: the additional human capital depresses their wages. Training policies can be better geared toward higher skill levels to let the least skilled benefit from the general equilibrium effects.
